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COMMENTARY/Refining Military Jurisdiction
over Civilians
PETER J. GRISHMAN*
Article 2(10) of the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) asserts
military jurisdiction "[iln time of war, [over] persons serving with or ac-
companying an armed force in the field."' The Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit was recently asked whether this article applies
to civilians presently serving with the armed forces in Vietnam.2 In Latney
v. lgnatius3 the district court had denied habeas corpus relief to the peti-
tioner, finding that his relationship with the military in Vietnam was such as
to subject him to military jurisdiction by virtue of Article 2(10).4 Reversing,
the court of appeals found that, in light of the Supreme Court's decision in
O'Callahan v. Parker,5 Article 2(10) could not be expanded to include a
civilian who had not been assimilated into the military organization, and who
* J.D., Case Western Reserve Law School, 1969; Assistant District Attorney, Bronx
County, New York; Member New York bar.
1. 10 U.S.C. § 802(10) (1964). In recent years the Supreme Court has declared
unconstitutional two provisions of the UCMJ which had vested jurisdiction in the mili-
tary to try civilians by court-martial in time of peace. In Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11
(1955), the Court declared unconstitutional Article 3(a) of the UCMJ, 10 U.S.C.
§ 803(a) (1964), which vested jurisdiction in the military over ex-servicemen charged
with offenses committed while in the military. In that case the petitioner, after being
honorably discharged from active military duty, was arrested by the military police and
returned to Korea to stand trial for murder and conspiracy alleged to have been com-
mitted while he was on active duty.
Article 2( 11), Uniform Code of Military Justice, 10 U.S.C. § 802(11) (1964), grant-
ing the military jurisdiction over all persons serving with, employed by, or accom-
panying the armed forces in foreign countries, was declared constitutionally inapplica-
ble to civilian dependents charged with murder overseas. Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1
(1957). Later, the Court held that this article did not apply to dependents charged
with noncapital offenses, Kinsella v. Singleton, 361 U.S. 234 (1960), nor to civilian
employees of the armed forces. McElroy v. Guagliardo, 361 U.S. 281 (1960); Grisham
v. Hagan, 361 U.S. 278 (1960).
2. Brief for Appellant at 12, 14-24, Latney v. Ignatius, 416 F.2d 821 (D.C. Cir.
1969).
3. 416 F.2d 821 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
4. Habeas Corpus No. 539-67 (D.D.C. 1968).
5. 395 U.S. 258 (1969).
Catholic University Law Review
was arrested and tried for committing a crime in a bar frequented only by
civilians.6
The distance of the Vietnamese conflict from the United States has necessi-
tated the American military's use of a large fleet of civilian merchant ships
to supply its troops. The SS Amtank was part of this fleet when it sailed
into DaNang Harbor on August 7, 1967. The ship was under a time charter
to the Military Sea Transport Service (MSTS), but was manned by a civilian
crew of which petitioner was a member. Under the charter agreement the
National Bulk Carriers, Inc. owned and operated the ship, and was re-
sponsible through its agent, the master of the ship, for the hiring and super-
vision of the crew. 7 The Naval officers attached to the MSTS could control
the ship only to the extent of directing its master as to which cargo to load
and to which port to sail with the ship.8 While the members of the crew
were in Vietnam they were not granted any of the privileges granted to
members of the armed forces or to civilians who were an integral part of the
United States Armed Forces Command in Vietnam. 9 They were not com-
pelled to observe the off-limits designation placed on certain areas by the
military authorities,' 0 and were even prohibited from entering military bases,
unless on official business or in need of medical assistance."
While the SS Amtank was unloading her cargo of petroleum products,
members of the crew were permitted to leave the ship. Latney had been at
odds with another member of the crew and when they met in a bar in
DaNang East they had an altercation which resulted in the death of the
6. 416 F.2d at 823.
7. Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus at 1, Habeas Corpus No. 539-67 (D.D.C.
1968).
8. Id. at 2.
9. Appellant, since he was a merchant seaman, was not allowed any of the rights,
benefits and privileges of a serviceman, such as post exchange and commissary privi-
leges; armed forces hospitalization and medical care; use of the armed forces mail
system; or use of military payment certificates. Nor was he subject to armed forces
regulations or entitled to a Geneva Convention identification card. Brief for
Appellant at 4, 5, Latney v. Ignatius, 416 F.2d 821 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
Compare these circumstances with those of the female dependents in Reid v. Covert,
354 U.S. 1 (1957), who "were transported overseas at government expense; they went
overseas with special passports which reflected their status as dependents of mili-
tary personnel; they received special commissary, post exchange, housing, postal, and
currency privileges; and so on." Everett, Military Jurisdiction over Civilians, 1960
DUKE L. REV. 366, 384.
10. Proceedings of Article 32 Pretrial Investigation at 16 (conducted Aug. 26 to
Sept. 2, 1967, in Da-Nang). Moreover, Mamasan's Bar, where the fight started, was
in an area of DaNang East that had been declared by the United States Armed Forces
Assistance Command to be off-limits to all military personnel and civilians em-
ployed by the armed forces. Id.
11. Id. at 16-17. Since there was no public health hospital in Vietnam the
civilian merchant seamen were permitted to go to a naval hospital when in need of
medical assistance.
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other seaman. Petitioner was apprehended on the beach by members of
the United States Marine Military Police. The United States Armed Forces
Command was able to obtain a rapid waiver of the Vietnamese primary juris-
diction 12 and then claimed the right under Article 2(10) to try Latney by
court-martial for violation of Article 118 of the UCMJ.' 8
Development of Anglo-American Military Jurisdiction over Civilians
Historically, the responsibility for the maintenance of discipline over civil-
ians accompanying the army fell on the commanding officer. 14  The British
parliament resisted all attempts by the Crown and the military to violate the
principle set forth in the Magna Carta that "no freeman shall be tried and
punished 'except by the lawful judgment of his peers and by the law of the
land.' "15 The civilian courts required the military authorities to prove why
a court-martial, which was of special and limited jurisdiction, did in fact have
jurisdiction over the accused. 10 There was a period during which the British
military was even prohibited from trying officers and soldiers except for
those crimes specifically mentioned in the Mutiny Act.' 7
The practice of permitting the military to try camp-followers by courts-
martial was continued during the Revolutionary War, even though the colo-
nists had seen the dangers to liberty which such procedures presented. The
founding fathers foresaw the need for maintaining the army, but also were
deeply attached to the principle that all trials be conducted by a judiciary
free from executive control and influence.' 8 This belief in a fair trial for all
accused led to the adoption by the first Congress of the Bill of Rights, which
among other things guarantees the right to a trial by jury and to a grand
jury indictment. 19
The military advocates contend that the source of military jurisdiction to
try civilians by courts-martial is Article I of the Constitution which gives
12. Colonel Broome, Latney's assigned defense counsel, reported that special pro-
cedures were used to obtain the necessary waiver of jurisdiction by the Vietnamese
Government. The only knowledge the district prosecutor had of the case con-
sisted of a brief entry in a police blotter. Letter from Lt. Col. Norris Broome, USMC
to Captain W.H. Hogan, Jr., USNR, Appellate Defense Division, Oct. 25, 1967.
13. 10 U.S.C. § 918 (1964). This article defines the various degrees of murder.
14. A. FORTESCUE, HISTORY OF THE BRITISH ARMY 89 (1899). See also W. WIN-
THROP, MILITARY LAW AND PRECEDENTS 98 (2d ed. 1920).
15. Maurer, The Court-Martialing of Camp Followers, World War 1, 9 AM. J.
LEGAL HIST. 203, 206 (1965).
16. Id. at 210.
17. See Wiener, History Vindicates the Supreme Court's Rulings on Military Juris-
diction, 51 A.B.A.J. 1127, 1128 (1965).
18. Girard, The Constitution and Court-Martial of Civilians Accompanying the
Armed Forces-A Preliminary Analysis, 13 STAN. L. REV. 461, 486-87 (1961).
19. U.S. CONST. amends. V, VI.
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Congress authority "To declare War, grant Letters of Marque and Re-
prisal, and make Rules concerning Captures .. ".. -o and the authority to
make all laws which are necessary for a successful execution of this constitu-
tional mandate. 21 They argue that this clause permits limitations on indi-
vidual freedoms and constitutionally guaranteed rights under certain condi-
tions:
In the face of an actively hostile enemy, military commanders nec-
essarily have broad power over persons on the battlefront. From
a time prior to the adoption of the Constitution the extraordinary
circumstances present in an area of actual fighting have been con-
sidered sufficient to permit punishment of some civilians in that
area by military courts under military rules.22
The military wants the authority to try civilians accompanying the army be-
cause it believes that this is the only way to protect the morale and discipline
of the troops against any civilian impairments. In United States v. Burney23
the United States Court of Military Appeals said that it would be demoral-
izing to a soldier if a civilian co-worker could commit a major offense and
then walk free, because the only institution capable of bringing about a rapid
disposition of the matter was prohibited from becoming involved. The court
declared: "There is no rational basis for this discrimination, and a fixed
belief in the minds of servicemen that the civilian component of an overseas
force is free from restraint, while the serviceman is closely circumscribed, has
an immediate, palpable, and adverse effect on discipline and morale. ' 24
Challenging the System
The first major challenge to the arbitrary use by the military of courts-
martial arose during the Civil War. The military commander of Indiana
had ordered the arrest and trial by a special military court of Lambden Mil-
ligan. 25 The Supreme Court ruled that the military had no authority to try
the petitioner, since "no usage of war could sanction a military trial there for
any offence whatever of a citizen in civil life, in nowise connected with the
military service,"' 26 especially when the civil courts in the area were open
and properly functioning. 27 The Court admitted that there could be in-
stances in which the jurisdiction over civilians could be constitutionally
20. Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 11.
21. Id. cl. 18.
22. Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 33 (1957).
23. 6 U.S.C.M.A. 776, 21 C.M.R. 98 (1956).
24. Id. at 800, 21 C.M.R. at 122.
25. Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2 (1866).
26. Id. at 121-22. This has been in part incorporated in Article 2(10).
27. Id. at 121.
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vested in the military, but that these instances must be limited to areas of
active hostilities in time of war.28
Thereafter the federal courts upheld the trial of civilians by courts-martial
during both world wars. These civilians were employed primarily in posi-
tions which were vital for a successful completion of the war effort and in
some instances the civilians were under the direct supervision of military of-
ficers. 29
In one instance a court denied the military authority to try a civilian be-
cause he was not directly connected with the military activities being con-
ducted on the base.30  In Hammond v. Squier3 1 the petitioner was a mer-
chant seaman who was employed on a ship that was being operated by a pri-
vate concern for the Navy during World War II, in a situation similar to that
which confronted Latney. He was charged with disobeying a lawful order,
being disrespectful to a superior and striking a civilian superior and was
tried and convicted by a special military commission. In granting a writ of
habeas corpus, the court pointed out that the court-martial authorities had
found "[t]he evidence in the case does not establish that the objectionable
language was of itself 'to the detriment of the success of the United States
military operations', as alleged," and therefore, "there [was] no basis what-
ever for the creation of the special military commission which tried
him . . . .. "32
Moreover, in Duncan v. Kahanamoku3 3 the Supreme Court prohibited
the military from supplanting the civilian courts which were open and prop-
erly functioning in Hawaii during the middle of World War II. Justice
Murphy in his concurring opinion pointed out that:
Those who founded this nation knew full well that the arbitrary
power of conviction and punishment for pretended offenses is the
hallmark of despotism. . . . History had demonstrated that fact
to them time and again. They shed their blood to win independence
from a ruler who they alleged was attempting to render the "Mili-
28. Id. at 127.
29. During World War I: Hines v. Mikell, 259 F. 28 (4th Cir. 1919); Ex parte
Jochen, 257 F. 200 (S.D. Tex. 1919); Ex parte Falls, 251 F. 415 (D.N.J. 1918);
Ex parte Gerlach, 247 F. 616 (S.D.N.Y. 1917). During World War II: Perlstein v.
United States,151 F.2d 167 (3d Cir. 1945); Shilman v. United States, 73 F. Supp. 648
(S.D.N.Y. 1947); In re Berue, 54 F. Supp. 252 (S.D. Ohio 1944); McCune v. Kil-
patrick, 53 F. Supp. 80 (E.D. Va. 1943).
30. Ex parte Weitz, 256 F. 58 (D. Mass. 1919). Petitioner was a chauffeur em-
ployed by a contractor who was doing work on a military base, whose duties involved
transporting certain civilians to and from different locations on the base. The case
arose when he accidentally ran down and killed a soldier on the base.
31. 51 F. Supp. 227 (W.D. Wash. 1943).
32. Id. at 231.
33. 327 U.S. 304 (1946). Duncan had assaulted two Marine sentries at the naval
base where he worked.
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tary independent of and superior to the Civil power" and who was
"depriving us . . . of the benefits of Trial by Jury." . . . This su-
premacy of the civil over the military is one of our great heritages.
It has made possible the attainment of a high degree of liberty regu-
lated by law rather than by caprice. Our duty is to give effect to
that heritage at all times, that it may be handed down untarnished
to future generations.3 4
In Toth v. Quarles, 5 a case which arose during a time of peace, the status
of the civilian in relation to the military was further refined. The Court
said that the military authorities could exercise court-martial jurisdiction over
a civilian only if it could show that the accused could be regarded as a per-
son falling within the class included in the term "land and naval Forces."3 6
In subsequent cases the Supreme Court has declared that in peacetime the
class of civilians who could be subject to military jurisdiction does not include
dependents of members of the armed forces,3 7 nor civilian employees of the
armed forces.3 8
More recently the Supreme Court in O'Callahan v. Parker,3 9 found that
the military need not be given jurisdiction to try a soldier by court-martial
for every criminal offense. Although the petitioner was a member of the
armed services on active duty when he committed the crime, the Court said
that he could not be tried by court-martial since the crime was not commit-
ted on a military post or enclave nor impaired the successful completion of
military affairs. 40  The Court felt that the right to trial by jury and to a
grand jury indictment were far too important to permit such an arbitrary
deprivation by the military. 41  Moreover, the law officers, who act as
judges at a court-martial, do not have the same degree of freedom and inde-
pendence as judges in state and federal courts. 42
The Status of the Vietnam Conflict
For the military to exercise constitutional jurisdiction over a civilian it
must first be shown that there is a time of war. The district court in Latney
34. Id. at 325.
35. 350 U.S. 11 (1955).
36. Id. at 15. The Court declared: "[Gliven its natural meaning, the power
granted Congress 'To make Rules' to regulate 'the land and naval Forces' would seem to
restrict court-martial jurisdiction to persons who are actually members or part of the
armed forces." Id.
37. Kinsella v. Singleton, 361 U.S. 234 (1960); Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1957).
38. McElroy v. Guagliardo, 361 U.S. 281 (1960); Grisham v. Hagan, 361 U.S. 278
(1960).
39. 395 U.S. 258 (1969).
40. ld. at 273-74.
41. Id. at 272-74. See 19 CATHOLIC U.L. REV. 101 (1969).
42. A law officer, acting as a military judge at a general court-martial could be
[Vol. XIX:351
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found that Vietnam constituted a "time of war" even though Congress has
made no official declaration. 48  This is not the first time that a court had
declared an armed conflict equivalent to a war. There has been no unity
of agreement among the courts as to what constitutes a war. In Bas v.
Tingy44 the Supreme Court said that there are two types of wars: "perfect"
wars (approved by Congress) and "imperfect" wars (lacking official ap-
proval). 45  A century later the Court declared: "While as between the
United States and other civilized nations, an act of Congress is necessary to
a formal declaration of war, no such act is necessary to constitute a state of
war with an Indian tribe."46
During the Korean War much legal controversy arose as to whether or
not the armed conflict there constituted a war. The United States Court of
Military Appeals took the position that the Korean conflict was a war, and
therefore special regulations could be applied to the soldiers serving there.
The court arrived at its conclusion after examing all the events surrounding
the armed conflict, such as: 1) increase in pay for the soldiers serving
there; 2) presence of large number of Americans on the battlefield of
Korea; 3) the number of casualties; 4) the increase in the draft; and 5)
the large sums being expended by the Government in order to achieve a
successful result. 47 If such a practical test were applied to the circumstances.
surrounding Vietnam there would be no difficulty in another court's declar-
ing that the armed conflict there also is a war. The status of the Vietnam
armed conflict is confusing in light of the limited declared purpose for the
presence of American soldiers there: "Mission: To assist the government
of Vietnam to defeat the VC/NVA forces and to extend GVN control
through out the Republic of Vietnam. ' 48  In any event, the Judge Advocate
General of the Army asserts the armed conflict in Vietnam is a war within
the meaning of the UCMJ and therefore, after the government of the Re-
under the direct command of the convening officer. MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTAL.
% 4(g)(1) (rev. ed. 1969). Under the recently passed amendments to the UCMJ,
however, the military judge is no longer under the command of the convening authority,
but is designated by the Judge Advocate General and detailed thereto. Military Justice
Act of 1968, 10 U.S.C. § 826 (Supp. IV, 1969). See 18 CATHOLIC U.L. REV. 429
(1969).
43. Habeas Corpus No. 539-67 (D.D.C. 1968).
44. 4 U.S. (4 Dall.) 322 (1800). The central question presented to the Court was
whether France could be considered an enemy for purposes of a salvage act passed by
Congress.
45. Id. at 324-25.
46. Montoya v. United States, 180 U.S. 261, 267 (1901).
47. United States v. Bancroft, 3 U.S.C.M.A. 3, 5-6, 11 C.M.R. 3, 5-6 (1953).
See also United States v. Taylor, 4 U.S.C.M.A. 232, 236-37, 15 C.M.R. 232, 236-37
(1954); United States v. Gann, 3 U.S.C.M.A. 12, 13, 11 C.M.R. 12, 13 (1953).
48. United States Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, Directive 10-11 (March
2, 1967).
19701
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public of Vietnam has waived primary jurisdiction over the accused civilian,
the United States military authorities have the right to try him by court-
martial.49
The power to resolve this question concerning the status of the Vietnam
conflict rests in the Congress. For, as one court said: "The existence
or nonexistence of a state of war is a political, not a judicial, question and
it is only when a formal declaration of war had been made by the Congress
that judicial cognizance may be taken thereof. Once so declared by the
political department, it becomes binding upon the courts, otherwise not."'50
The ultimate requirement of Article 2(10) of the UCMJ is that the
civilian be "in the field." Most authorities favor a limited interpretation of
this phrase since it would otherwise permit the military to encroach on the
jurisdiction which is vested in the civil courts by the Constitution. Colonel
Winthrop, the Blackstone of military law, believes that the term should be
construed to encompass only areas of active hostilities.5 ' This view was
mentioned by the Court in its opinion in Reid v. Covert: "Experts on mili-
tary law, the Judge Advocate General and the Attorney General have re-
peatedly taken the position that 'in the field' means in an area of actual
fighting."'5 2
When the altercation took place in August of 1967 DaNang was not a
theatre of hostilities. The United States Marines had reported that upon
landing there in 1965 they had met no enemy opposition on the beach, but
instead were met by village leaders, army officers and students who pre-
sented gifts to the troops as they came ashore. 53 Regulations of the United
Service Organization prohibit it from establishing operations in any area
which has not been declared secure by the Department of Defense. This
organization had been operating in the DaNang area long before the alter-
cation took place. Furthermore:
Approximately 100 yards north from Mamasan's Bar, where the
offense allegedly occurred, is located a beach house which is re-
served for the recreational use of the Assistant Commander, III
Marine Amphibious Force. Approximately 500 yards south of
Mamasan's Bar is located an Officer's Club and Rest and Rehabili-
tation Center, which had been in operation about a year prior to
August 11, 1967.5 4
49. Record of Oral Argument, Latney v. Ignatius, 416 F.2d 821 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
See also Keefe, Court Martial of Civilians, 53 A.B.A.J. 961 (1967).
50. Pyramid Life Ins. Co. v. Masch, 134 Colo. 70, 73, 299 P.2d 117, 119 (1956).
The court ruled that the Korean conflict did not constitute a war and therefore the
insurer was liable to the beneficiary under a double indemnity provision.
51. W. WINTHROP, MILITARY LAW AND PRECEDENTS 101 (2d ed. 1920).
52. 354 U.S. 1, 34 n.61 (1957).
53. 9th Marine Expeditionary Brigade Command Diary (March 1965).
54. Brief for Appellant at 44, Latney v. Ignatius, 416 F.2d 821 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
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Conclusion
Civilians play a vital role in the American war effort in Vietnam. The
constitutional rights of these civilians require protection from military en-
croachment. One solution which has been set forth by the Supreme Court
would be for the Congress to vest jurisdiction over all such cases in a federal
district court.55 Another would be for Congress to make an official declara-
tion as to the status of every military armed conflict. Either of these pro-
cedures would prevent the military from encroaching on the jurisdiction
vested by the Constitution in civil court, and thereby, also prevent the ar-
bitrary deprivation of constitutionally protected rights of civilians, especially
when the status of the conflict is in open dispute. Prior to Latney any
other course of action would have permitted the Executive to unilaterally
decide when the military is to have jurisdiction over a civilian so that he can
be tried by court-martial. However, with the decision by the court of ap-
peals neither proposal is needed to insure a jury trial to a civilian in Vietnam
whose actions do not impede the armed forces. But if he does hinder the
military, he is still subject to military jurisdiction, because the Latney court
failed to answer the question of whether the Executive branch has the uni-
lateral authority to declare war and deprive a person of his constitutional
right to a trial by jury of his peers.
55. Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11, 21 (1955). The armed services have seen this
problem ever since Toth, but have refused to seek legislation to rectify it. Instead
they have continually tried to argue around it in an attempt to justify their actions.
The Supreme Court has already upheld a statute which vests jurisdiction in a federal
district court for a crime committed outside of the territorial United States. Blackmer
v. United States, 284 U.S. 421 (1932).
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